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Abstract 
This study investigates the determinants of and persistence in access to weapons using a 
global sample of 163 countries for the period 2010 to 2015. The empirical evidence is based 
on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Hysteresis in access to weapons is consistently 
more apparent in countries with below-median levels in access to weapons, compared to their 
counterparts with above-median levels in access to weapons. The hysteresis hypothesis within 
this context is the propensity of past values of access to weapons to influence future values of 
access to weapons. Factors that consistently drive access to weapons are: perceptions of 
crime; criminality; conflict intensity; political instability; military expenditure, violent 
demonstrations and terrorism. The effects of these drivers are contingent on initial levels of 
access to weapons. Policy recommendations for managing access to weapons are discussed.   
 
JEL Classification: H56; L64; K42; P50 
Keywords: Access to weapons; Global evidence; Persistence; Arms; Security  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study builds on three tendencies in policy and academic circles, notably: 
(i) the increasing cost of conflicts in the globe; (ii) the relevance of policy makers to have 
insights into the  hysteresis (or persistence) of access to weapons and determinants of such 
hysteresis and (iii)  attendant gaps in the literature.  The highlighted points are substantiated in 
the same chronology.  
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 First, the cost of conflicts and crime is steadily increasing across the world. This now 
represents a substantial policy syndrome, not least because as of 2014, about 13% of the 
global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was allocated to preventing and mitigating the 
consequences of terrorism and conflicts. This narrative is consistent with the Global Peace 
Index (GPI, 2015) and Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2017). To put this point into more 
perspective, the corresponding annual expenditure is equivalent to the GDP of the following 
countries: the United Kingdom (UK), Spain, Germany, France, Canada and Brazil. Access to 
weapons is logically a fundamental cause of conflicts and crimes for which the substantial 
proportion of global GDP is devoted to curtailing. In the light of the other global development 
concerns (e.g. the post-2015 development agenda), the underlying expenditure might be better 
spent in addressing concerns surrounding the achievement of sustainable development goals.  
 Second, given the importance of access to weapons in fuelling conflicts and wars, it is 
relevant for policy to have insights into factors that drive the persistence in access to weapons 
and how such persistence varies across important fundamentals (e.g. income levels and 
regional proximity). In essence, a critical understanding of these concerns can enlighten 
policy makers on measures that can be implemented to prevent, reduce or increase access to 
weapons, contingent on policy objectives.  
 Third, this study is also important because of an apparent gap in the literature. 
Accordingly, as far as we have reviewed, the extant literature has not focused on determinants 
of and persistence in access to weapons in the world. Accordingly, the existing literature 
surrounding the subject matter can be summarized in two categories, namely, on: 
determinants of access to weapons and drivers of the weaponry industry. With regard to the 
latter category, studies have focused on, inter alia: nuclear proliferation and security 
guarantees (Bleek & Lorber, 2015); questioning the incidence of nuclear weapons on conflicts 
and wars (Bell & Miller, 2015); the relationship between nuclear deployment, 
nonproliferation and nuclear strategy (Fuhrmann  &  Sechser, 2014); investigating the 
relevance of possessing nuclear weapons (Suni, 2015) and the  importance of weapon law and 
assault weapon bans on murder rates (Gius, 2014).  
As concerns the former category, the literature has largely articulated, among others: 
mitigating access to weapons by individuals who have suicide intensions (Barber & Miller, 
2014); access to firearms by citizens who are victimized by mental disorders (Pinals et al., 
2015);  the importance of technological corporation in the fabrication of  nuclear weapons 
(Brown & Kaplow, 2014); defence signals and defensive weapons in plants (Maag et al., 
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2015) and nexuses between ornaments, the choice of weapons and sex (McCullough et al., 
2016).  
 The theoretical basis for investigating the determinant of access to weapons is broadly 
in line with both contemporary and non-contemporary literature on the hysteresis  (or 
persistence) of (in) economic phenomena. On the contemporary front, we find recent studies 
that have focused on inclusive development (see Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; Asongu, 2014; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a); financial intermediary development (Stephan & Tsapin, 
2008; Goddard et al., 2011) and stock market development (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 
2012; Asongu, 2013). Conversely, non-contemporary studies constitute the bulk of seminal 
papers on cross-country economic convergence (see Baumol, 1986;  Barro, 1991; Mankiw et 
al., 1992; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995).  
 It is worthwhile to articulate that, new theories of economic growth were constructed 
in the post-Keynesian era. In essence, the theoretical studies became prominent owing to 
considerable improvements in the neoclassical revolution which culminated in significant 
changes in cross-country differences in income levels. Concepts of market equilibrium 
models were proposed and applied within this theoretical framework. Such models were 
essentially founded on economic growth theories which predicted absolute decrease in cross-
country variations in income levels (see Mayer-Foulkes, 2010). Consistent with Mayer-
Foulkes (2010), the highlighted convergence trends in per capita income have been 
fundamentally traceable to the positive externalities from “free market competition”. The 
attendant convergence literature can be summarized into two main schools of thought. First, 
one strand of studies has established the presence of divergence or the absence of 
convergence. This strand is substantiated with the arguments that owing to multiple equilibria 
and the variations in initial endowments, it is not feasible to establish convergence in income 
levels across nations (Barro, 1991; Pritchett, 1997). Conversely, another strand of the 
theoretical literature holds that, regardless of initial conditions, variations in income levels 
across countries can occur within the perspective of countries’ steady state and long-run 
equilibrium (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a).  
 It is relevant to clarify that this study is not positioned to confirm or reject any of the 
contending strands. The purpose of the inquiry is to leverage on the information criteria used 
by both studies to either reject or confirm the evidence of convergence. In order to provide 
more space for policy implications, the analysis is tailored to emphasize initial levels of 
access to weapons. The motivation for articulating initial levels of the outcome indicator is 
that blanket policies on determinants of and persistence in access to weapons may be 
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ineffective, unless they are contingent on existing levels of access to weapons and therefore 
tailored distinctly across countries with high and low levels in access to weapons. Consistent 
with contemporary  development literature, the emphasis of fundamental features is critical to 
results with more robust policy implications  (D’Amico, 2010; Narayan et al., 2011; Beegle et 
al., 2016; Mlachila et al., 2017;  Asongu & le Roux, 2017;  Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b; 
Asongu et al., 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c).  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The data and methodology are covered in 
Section 2 while Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes with future 
research directions.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
The  paper investigates a sample of 163 countries with data for the period 2010 to 2015 from 
a plethora of sources, namely: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related 
Deaths Dataset; Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP); the United Nations Committee on 
Contributions;  a Qualitative assessment by the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) analysts’ 
estimates; the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime 
Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS). Consistent with recent 
literature, the geographical and temporal scopes are motivated by data availability constraints 
at the time of the study (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2019; Asongu et al., 2019a, 2019b).  
 The dependent variable is “access to weapons” in terms of ease of access to small arms 
and light weapons.  A multitude  independent variables are employed in the conditional 
information set, namely: internal conflict fought; external conflicts;  deaths from internal 
conflicts; deaths from external conflicts; intensity of internal conflict; perception of 
criminality; displaced people; political instability; political terror; terrorism impact; homicide; 
violent crime; violent demonstrations; incarcerations; security officers and  polices; military 
expenditure; armed service personnel; weapon imports; weapons exports and United Nations 
Peace Keeping Funding (UNPKF). These control variables have been substantially 
documented in the literature on weapon proliferation and access to weapons (Barber & Miller, 
2014; Brown & Kaplow, 2014; Brown & Kaplow, 2014; Maag et al., 2015; McCullough et 
al., 2016). 
                 
6 
 
Table 1: Definitions and sources of variables 
  
Variables  Definitions and sources of variables  
  
Internal conflicts fought Number and duration of internal conflicts 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-
State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset; Institute for Economics 
and Peace (IEP) 
  
Deaths from external 
conflict 
Number of deaths from organised conflict (external) 
UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset 
£  
Deaths from internal 
conflict  
Number of deaths from organised conflict (internal)International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) Armed Conflict Database (ACD) 
  
External conflicts fought Number, duration and role in external conflicts 
UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; IEP 
  
Intensity of internal 
conflict  
Intensity of organised internal conflict 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
  
Perceptions of Criminality  Level of perceived criminality in society 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Displaced people  Number of refugees and internally displaced people 
as a percentage of the population 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Mid-Year Trends; 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 
  
Political instability  Political instability 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Political Terror Political Terror Scale 
Qualitative assessment of Amnesty International and 
US State Department yearly reports 
  
Terrorism impact Impact of terrorism 
IEP Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 
  
Homicides  Number of homicides per 100,000 people 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates 
  
Violent crime  Level of violent crime 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Violent demonstrations  Likelihood of violent demonstrations 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Incarceration  Number of jailed population per 100,000 people 
World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex 
  
Security Officers & Police Number of internal security officers and police 
per 100,000 people UNODC; EIU estimates 
  
Military expenditure  Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
The Military Balance, IISS 
  
Armed Services Personnel Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people 
The Military Balance, IISS 
  
Weapon imports  Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons 
as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers 
Database 
  
Weapon exports Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 
100,000 people 
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
  
United Nations 
Peacekeeping Funding. 
Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions 
United Nations Committee on Contributions; IEP 
  
  
Access to Weapons  Ease of access to small arms and light weapons 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
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UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. EIU: Economic Intelligence Unit. UNHCR: United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. IISS: The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies.  UN: United Nations. IEP: Institute for Economics and Peace.  
 
 
Table  2: Summary Statistics and presentation of countries  
      
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Internal conflicts fought 1.458 1.024 1.000 5.000 977 
      
Deaths from external conflict 1.105 0.335 1.000 3.371 978 
£      
Deaths from internal conflict  1.405 0.933 1.000 5.000 978 
      
External conflicts fought  1.642 1.166 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Intensity of internal conflict  2.412 1.162 1.000 5.000 978 
      
      
Criminality  3.153 0.917 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Displaced people  1.348 0.872 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Political instability  2.545 1.030 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Political Terror 2.584 1.091 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Terrorism impact 1.799 0.936 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Homicides  2.797 1.154 1.103 5.000 978   
      
Violent crime  2.768 1.136 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Violent demonstrations  2.912 0.969 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Incarceration  2.194 0.889 1.150 5.000 978    
      
Security Officers & Police 2.728 0.911 1.081 5.000 978 
      
Military expenditure  1.966 0.824 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Armed Services Personnel 1.648 0.725 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Weapon imports  1.489 0.868 1.000 5.000 978   
      
Weapon exports 1.342 0.932 1.000 5.000 978   
      
United Nations Peacekeeping 
Funding. 
2.291 1.164 1.000 5.000 978 
      
Access to Weapons  3.116 1.080 1.000 5.000 978 
      
      
Panel  B: Presentation of countries 
      “Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d' Ivoire; Croatia; Cuba; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; 
Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; 
Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kosovo; Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; 
Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; 
Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New 
Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; North Korea; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palestine; Panama; Papua New 
Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the Congo; Romania; Russia; 
Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Somalia; South Africa; 
South Korea; South Sudan; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; 
Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; The Gambia; Timor-Leste; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; 
Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia and Zimbabwe”. 
      
      
Standard dev: Standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.  
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Table 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 731) 
                       
Crime Sec Hom Inca Wea CoIn Dem Crim PolIn PolTe Wimp TerIm DIC ICF Milit ASP UNP NHW Wexp DP ECF DEC  
1.00 -0.023 0.510 -0.054 0.615 0.517 0.473 0.672 0.449 0.531 -0.318 0.302 0.337 0.318 -0.008 -0.158 0.277 -0.022 -0.155 0.182 -0.240 -0.042 Crime 
 1.000 -0.024 0.274 -0.035 -0.014 -0.084 -0.117 -0.0007 -0.068 0.148 -0.021 0.011 -0.071 0.128 0.228 -0.032 0.066 0.014 0.064 -0.077 -0.163 Sec 
  1.000 0.184 0.564 0.320 0.276 0.612 0.241 0.394 -0.335 0.029 0.189 0.179 -0.150 -0.246 0.320 -0.194 -0.209 0.010 -0.222 -0.143 Hom 
   1.000 -0.104 -0.037 -0.149 -0.059 -0.138 -0.018 -0.063 -0.013 -0.078 -0.125 0.076 0.180 -0.151 0.169 0.119 -0.053 0.229 0.084 Inca 
    1.000 0.548 0.526 0.649 0.573 0.551 -0.349 0.288 0.319 0.380 0.089 -0.119 0.349 -0.123 -0.165 0.239 -0.240 0.038 Wea 
     1.000 0.533 0.480 0.658 0.639 -0.273 0.558 0.469 0.514 0.198 0.026 0.289 0.002 -0.227 0.338 -0.305 -0.002 CoIn 
      1.000 0.566 0.659 0.533 -0.269 0.371 0.283 0.281 0.048 -0.043 0.291 -0.041 -0.222 0.138 -0.198 0.043 Dem 
       1.000 0.433 0.528 -0.394 0.247 0.294 0.279 -0.199 -0.269 0.275 -0.186 -0.246 0.097 -0.247 -0.073 Crim 
        1.000 0.589 -0.257 0.300 0.222 0.272 0.294 0.092 0.394 -0.138 -0.283 0.235 -0.236 0.011 PolIn 
         1.000 -0.326 0.590 0.590 0.583 0.186 -0.018 0.335 0.129 -0.205 0.279 -0.269 0.069 PolTe 
          1.000 -0.043 -0.130 -0.098 0.314 0.498 -0.208 0.124 0.127 -0.059 0.125 0.041 WImp 
           1.000 0.719 0.720 0.250 0.136 0.031 0.426 0.090 0.269 -0.141 0.233 TerIm 
            1.000 0.803 0.095 0.009 0.076 0.237 -0.061 0.311 -0.145 0.082 DIC 
             1.000 0.158 0.046 0.106 0.221 -0.075 0.297 -0.163 0.118 ICF 
              1.000 0.579 -0.018 0.209 0.048 0.232 -0.059 0.288 Milit 
               1.000 -0.135 0.255 0.105 0.235 0.024 0.187 ASP 
                1.000 -0.245 -0.198 0.078 -0.257 -0.149 UNP 
                 1.000 0.390 -0.109 0.104 0.398 NHW 
                  1.000 -0.103 0.102 0.402 Wexp 
                   1.000 -0.019 0.114 DP 
                    1.000 0.213 ECF 
                     1.000 DEC 
                       
Crime: Perceptions of criminality. Sec: Security Office & Police. Hom: Homicide. Inca: Incarceration. Wea: Access to Weapons. CoIn: Intensity of Internal Conflict. Dem: Violent Demonstrations.  Crim: Violent crime. PolIn: Political Instability. 
PolTe: Political Terror. Wimp: Weapons import. TerIm: Terrorism Impact. DIC: Deaths from internal conflict. ICF: Internal Conflict Fought. Milit: Military Expenditure. ASP: Armed Services Personnel. UNP: United Nations Peacekeeping Funding. 
NHW: Nuclear and Heavy Weapons. Wexp: Weapons Export. DP: Displaced People. ECF: External Conflict Fought. DEC: Deaths from external conflict.  
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The definitions and sources of variables are disclosed in Table 1 whereas the summary 
statistics and sampled countries are presented respectively in Panel A and Panel B of Table 2.  
The correlation matrix is provided in Table 3. From the summary statistics, it is apparent that 
variables are comparable (from the perspective of means). Moreover, given the standard 
deviations, one can be confident that reasonable estimated relationships will emerge from the 
regressions.   Since we are using 20 variables in the conditioning information set, concerns of 
multicollinearity are very likely to emerge. The concerns about multicollinearity (identified in 
bold) are avoided the modelling exercise. Hence, we avoid introducing two variables with a 
high degree of substitution in the same specification.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
 In this study, the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach is 
adopted because it is consistent with behavior of the data on the one hand and on the other, 
aligns with conditions and advantages for the application of the estimation approach. 
Moreover, the underlying empirical strategy is in accordance with recent literature on the 
convergence of macroeconomic outcomes (see Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a; Doyle, 2017). 
The following four fundamental points motivate the empirical approach. First, the 
T(6)<N(163) condition for the application of the technique is met because the number of 
periods in a time series of each cross section is substantially lower than the number of cross 
sections. Second, given that the estimation strategy is designed to be applied on panel data, 
the empirical strategy does not eliminate cross-country variations. Third, by employing 
instrumental variables and controlling for time-invariant variables, there is some bite on 
endogeneity.  Fourth, the system estimator corrects inherent small biases that are specific to 
the difference estimator. 
 The Roodman (2009a, 2009b) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) is adopted in 
place of traditional difference and system GMM approaches. This is essentially because the 
more contemporary approach has been documented to:  (i) limit the proliferation of 
instruments   (or restrict over-identification) and (ii) control for cross-sectional dependence 
(Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a; Boateng et al., 2018; Baltagi, 2008; Love & Zicchino, 2006).                                                                     
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
tititih
h
htiti XWW ,,,
20
1
,10,    

                                                                       (1)                                                   
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,           (2)                                                                                                                          
where, tiW ,
 
is an indicator of access to weapons  in country i
 
at  period t , 0  is a constant, 
 
X  is the vector of control variables (internal conflict fought; external conflicts;  deaths from 
internal conflicts; deaths from external conflicts; intensity of internal conflict; perception of 
criminality; displaced people; political instability; political terror; terrorism impact; homicide; 
violent crime; violent demonstrations; incarcerations; security officers and  polices; military 
expenditure; armed services personnel; weapon imports; weapons exports and United Nations 
Peace Keeping Funding (UNPKF)),
 

 
represents the coefficient of auto-regression which is 
one for the specification, t
 
is the time-specific constant,
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect and 
ti ,  the error term. In what follows, we provide insights into the identification process.  
 Identification and exclusion restriction are indispensable for a sound GMM estimation. 
As far as the identification process is concerned, we are consistent with recent empirical 
literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Boateng et al., 2018; 
Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Tchamyou et al., 2019)  in considering years as exclusively 
exogenous variables while the indicators in the conditioning information set are 
acknowledged as “endogenous explaining”, “suspected endogenous” and predetermined 
variables. It is important to articulate that this identification process is in accordance with 
Roodman (2009b) in perspective that it is not very feasible for years to be endogenous after a 
first difference1.   
 As concerns exclusion restrictions, consistent with the process of identification, the 
time invariant variables affect the dependent variables exclusively via the channels 
constituting the conditioning information set. Hence, the assumption of exclusion restriction 
holds when the corresponding hypothesis of exclusion restriction is not rejected. The 
hypothesis of exclusion restriction is the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity 
of instruments. In other words, the strictly exogenous variables or main instruments should 
elucidate “access to weapons” exclusively via the engaged suspected endogenous variables or 
selected mechanisms. It is broadly consistent with the standard IV procedure in which, failure 
to reject the null hypothesis corresponding to the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) 
test implies that the strictly exogenous variables affect access to weapons exclusively through 
                                                          
1
 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for 
predetermined variables. 
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the suspected endogenous variable channels (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016c). 
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Presentation of results  
The empirical findings are disclosed in Tables 4-5. Each table has three sets of specifications. 
There are multiple sets of specifications to avoid the concerns of multicollinearity identified 
in Table 3. Consistent with the motivation of the study, in order to articulate the dynamic 
character of the analysis, the full sample is disaggregated into below- and above-median sub-
samples, in order to assess how initial levels of access to weapons affect the investigated 
determinants and persistence. Four main information criteria are used to examine the validity 
of the GMM models2. Based on these criteria, the models are overwhelmingly valid. It is also 
imperative to emphasize that, whereas the models may be valid, the validity of models is not a 
sufficient condition to conclude on evidence of persistence in the outcome variable. This 
perspective is substantiated in what follows.  
 In the light of the attendant literature, convergence is established when the estimated 
lagged value of the dependent variable meets two critical conditions, namely: the estimated 
coefficient  has to be statistically significant on the one hand and on the other hand, the 
corresponding estimated coefficient should fall within an interval that is consistent with the 
convergence criterion. Within the framework of this study, the absolute value of the 
underlying estimated lagged endogenous variable should fall within the interval of zero and 
one. This criterion is consistent with recent literature on the subject (see Fung, 2009, p. 58; 
Asongu, 2013, p. 192; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 
2012b, p. 23; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d, p. 459). 
 Cognizant of the above insights, when comparing below- and above-median sub-
samples, the sub-sample which reflects a higher estimated lagged coefficient is logically the 
sub-sample that reflects a higher level of persistence in access to weapons. The intuition 
behind the inference is that, within a comparative framework, the magnitude is important for 
                                                          
2
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments isalso employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2017, p.200). 
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comparison because it translates how past values in access to weapons affects future values in 
access to weapons.  
 The following findings are apparent in Tables 4-5. First, hysteresis in access to 
weapons is more important in countries with below-median levels of access to weapons. This 
tendency is consistent across tables and specifications. The hysteresis hypothesis within this 
context is the propensity of past values of access to weapons to influence future values of 
access to weapons.  Second, the following factors consistently drive access to weapons: 
perceptions of crime; criminality; conflict intensity; political instability; military expenditure; 
violent demonstrations and terrorism.  
 
   Table 4: Drivers of access to weapons (First main sets of specifications) 
          
 Dependent variable: Access to Weapons 
          
 First Set of Specification Second Set of Specification Third Set of Specification 
          
 Full 
Sample 
Access 
≤M 
Access
>M 
Full 
Sample 
Access
≤M 
Access
>M 
Full 
Sample 
Access 
≤M 
Access 
>M 
          
Constant  0.219 0.045 1.325*** -0.027 0.031 1.478*** -0.195 -0.085 1.115*** 
 (0.170) (0.123) (0.292) (0.207) (0.183) (0.277) (0.154) (0.131) (0.245) 
Access to weapons  (-1) 0.861*** 0.745*** 0.507*** 0.894*** 0.913*** 0.492*** 0.998*** 0.926*** 0.627*** 
 (0.042) (0.062) (0.080) (0.039) (0.061) (0.066) (0.042) (0.053) (0.057) 
Crime 0.049 0.078** 0.085*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.040) (0.036) (0.026)       
Criminality  --- --- --- 0.065* 0.016 -0.020 --- --- --- 
    (0.036) (0.030) (0.036)    
Security Officers & Police -0.040 0.019 -0.001 -0.055 0.038 0.083* -0.067** -0.036 0.001 
 (0.035) (0.032) (0.028) (0.033) (0.036) (0.042) (0.026) (0.036) (0.036) 
Conflict intensity  --- --- --- 0.092*** 0.079*** 0.059* --- --- --- 
    (0.031) (0.028) (0.034)    
Political Instability 0.030 0.023 0.099*** --- --- --- 0.095*** 0.060* 0.103** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.027)    (0.034) (0.033) (0.041) 
Weapons import -0.015 -0.013 -0.003 0.018 -0.028 0.045 --- --- --- 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.031)    
Displaced persons  -0.076** 0.115** 0.035* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.032) (0.052) (0.020)       
Military Expenditure  0.116*** 0.083* 0.022 --- --- --- 0.052 0.048 0.049 
 (0.034) (0.049) (0.024)    (0.035) (0.059) (0.029) 
Violent Demonstrations --- --- --- 0.053* 0.030 0.087** --- --- --- 
    (0.029) (0.020) (0.039)    
Incarcerations  --- --- --- -0.045 -
0.070*** 
-0.015 --- --- --- 
    (0.039) (0.025) (0.021)    
Death from internal conflicts  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.024 0.134*** -0.005 
       (0.028) (0.040) (0.013) 
UNPKF --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.002 0.002 0.004 
       (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) 
          
AR(1) [0.016 ] [0.007]  [ 0.147]  [0.011 ] [0.007 ] [0.138 ] [0.018 ] [0.006 ] [ 0.150] 
AR(2) [0.327] [0.309]  [ 0.218] [ 0.301] [ 0.838] [ 0.257] [0.280 ] [0.506] [ 0.207] 
Sargan OIR [0.000 ]  [0.002]  [0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [ 0.000] [ 0.003] [0.000 ] [ 0.000] 
Hansen OIR [ 0.552]  [ 0.105]  [0.493]  [0.795 ] [ 0.383] [ 0.497] [ 0.881] [0.092 ] [ 0.755] 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
         
H excluding group [ 0.500]  [0.578 ]  [0.352 ]  [0.889 ] [0.042 ] [0.299] [ 0.832] [0.426] [ 0.494] 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) [0.510 ] [ 0.052]  [ 0.547] [ 0.570] [0.896 ] [ 0.600] [0.748 ] [0.062] [ 0.762] 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) H 
excluding group 
[0.356 ]  [ 0.128]  [0.434 ]  [0.759 ] [0.195 ] [0.382] [0.883 ] [0.101 ] [ 0.636] 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) [ 0.883] [ 0.224]  [0.525 ] [ 0.576] [ 0.941] [0.667] [0.537 ] [0.252 ] [ 0.724] 
Fisher 49.70*** 79.86*** 33.14*** 56.00*** 48.83*** 24.09*** 70.13*** 165.25*** 16.61*** 
Instruments 31 31 31 31 31 31 27 27 27 
Countries  163 99 72 163 99 72 163 99 72 
Observations  815 476 339 815 476 339 815 476 339 
          
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. M: Median. M=3. “( )” are standard errors while “[ ]” are p-values. 
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Table 5: Drivers of access to weapons (Second main sets of specifications) 
          
 Dependent variable: Access to Weapons 
          
 Fourth  Set of Specification Fifth  Set of Specification Sixth Set of Specification 
          
 Full 
Sample 
Access
≤M 
Access
>M 
Full 
Sample 
Access 
≤M 
Access
>M 
Full 
Sample 
Access 
≤M 
Access 
>M 
          
Constant  0.325** 0.038 0.988*** 0.007 0.068 1.693*** 0.200 0.079 1.587*** 
 (0.155) (0.203) (0.250) (0.119) (0.124) (0.193) (0.210) (0.231) (0.264) 
Access to weapons  (-1) 0.862*** 0.917*** 0.600*** 0.960*** 0.896*** 0.493*** 0.800*** 0.787*** 0.538*** 
 (0.042) (0.051) (0.046) (0.033) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) (0.059) (0.060) 
Criminality  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.079* 0.055 0.049 
       (0.047) (0.038) (0.047) 
Security Officers & Police -0.001 -0.003 0.071** -0.027 0.022 0.021 -0.017 -0.002 0.062* 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.028) (0.025) (0.023) (0.043) (0.052) (0.035) 
Homicides  -0.060* -0.019 0.022 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.032)       
Incarcerations 0.001 0.011 0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.029)       
Conflict Intensity  0.108*** 0.084*** 0.142*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.034)       
Conflict Fought  0.003 0.006 -0.017 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.026)       
Political Instability --- --- --- 0.053* 0.017 0.106*** --- --- --- 
    (0.029) (0.029) (0.026)    
Weapons import --- --- --- -0.038** -0.030 -
0.051*** 
--- --- --- 
    (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)    
Weapon export --- --- --- 0.002 0.0003 0.012 --- --- --- 
    (0.005) (0.006) (0.012)    
Displaced persons  --- --- --- 0.011 0.037 0.071*** --- --- --- 
    (0.032) (0.037) (0.017)    
Military Expenditure  --- --- --- 0.060** 0.042 -0.005 0.077** 0.088 0.005 
    (0.030) (0.046) (0.025) (0.033) (0.070) (0.025) 
Political Terror --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.029* 0.005 -0.060** 
       (0.016) (0.025) (0.029) 
Terror  Impact  --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.076** 0.053* 0.085*** 
       (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) 
UNPKF 0.003 0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.012 --- --- --- 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)    
          
AR(1) [0.019 ] [ 0.005] [ 0.115] [0.026 ] [ 0.007] [ 0.165] [ 0.025] [0.009 ] [ 0.174] 
AR(2) [0.232 ] [ 0.625] [ 0.189] [ 0.240] [ 0.271] [ 0.159] [ 0.334] [ 0.367] [ 0.341] 
Sargan OIR [ 0.006] [ 0.005] [ 0.004] [ 0.000] [ 0.002] [ 0.000] [0.000 ] [ 0.002] [ 0.000] 
Hansen OIR [ 0.736] [ 0.395] [ 0.473] [ 0.932] [ 0.559] [ 0.368] [ 0.645] [ 0.345] [ 0.448] 
DHT for instruments 
(a)Instruments in levels 
         
H excluding group [0.785] [0.103 ] [0.395 ] [0.531 ] [0.371 ] [ 0.683] [0.465 ] [0.133 ] [ 0.345] 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) [0.561] [ 0.739] [ 0.488] [ 0.958] [0.671 ] [0.223 ] [0.643 ] [ 0.605] [ 0.491] 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff)) H 
excluding group 
[0.828 ] [0.183 ] [ 0.257] [0.828 ] [0.385 ] [0.392 ] [0.727 ] [ 0.168] [ 0.512] 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) [0.295] [ 0.991] [ 0.958] [ 0.953] [ 0.866] [ 0.328] [ 0.324] [ 0.893] [ 0.301] 
Fisher 50.46*** 112.3*** 38.97*** 93.92*** 109.54*** 65.96*** 44.11*** 27.16*** 14.16*** 
Instruments 31 31 31 35 35 35 27 27 27 
Countries  163 99 72 163 99 72 163 99 72 
Observations  815 476 339 815 476 339 815 476 339 
          
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of 
the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. M: Median. M=3. “( )” are standard errors while “[ ]” are p-values.  
 
4. Concluding implications and future research directions 
 
This study has investigated the determinants of and persistence in access to weapons using a 
global sample of 163 countries for the period 2010 to 2015. The empirical evidence is based 
on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Hysteresis in access to weapons is consistently 
more apparent in countries with below-median levels of access to weapons, compared to their 
counterparts with above-median levels in access to weapons. The hysteresis hypothesis within 
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this context is the propensity of past values of access to weapons to influence future values of 
access to weapons. Factors that consistently drive access to weapons are: perceptions of 
crime; criminality; conflict intensity; political instability; military expenditure; violent 
demonstrations and terrorism. The effects of these drivers are contingent on the level of 
access to weapons.  
The motivation for articulating initial levels of the outcome indicator is that blanket 
policies on determinants of and persistence in access to weapons may be ineffective, unless 
they are contingent on existing levels of access to weapons and therefore tailored distinctly 
across countries with high and low initial levels of access to weapons. In what follows, we 
discuss some policy measures that can be implemented to reduce/mitigate access to weapons.  
In order to manage access to weapons efficiently, the following are some measures 
that can implemented by governments of sampled countries. (i) First and foremost, policies 
should be data-driven such that measures are contingent on empirically-grounded evidence. 
(ii) Given the contingency of determinants of and hysteresis in “access to weapons”, on initial 
levels of access to weapons, it is relevant to focus on “hot spots” and “hot people” given that 
access to weapons is likely to  be contingent on, inter alia: young factions of the population, 
poor neighborhoods,   the less educated and specific periods of the day.  (iii) Measures 
devoted to reducing and mitigating access to weapons should encompass joint efforts devoted 
to addressing strained nexuses between the police and the community, especially in regions 
that are most affected by crimes, violence and access to weapons. The intuition for this policy 
prescription is that the lack of trust in the police may push members in a community to 
increase their access to weapons in order to better secure themselves and protect their 
property. (iv) It is also important to improve law and order within the framework of how 
investigations into (and subsequently the prosecution of) those without the right to possess 
weapons are executed. Furthermore, policing in the light of reducing the proliferation of 
15 
 
weapons should be more focused on preventive measures, especially with reference to gang-
related conflicts and international homicides. (v) Access to weapons can also be prevented by 
focusing on the identified characteristics that are critical in driving the phenomenon.  Future 
studies can focus on country-specific studies in order to provide findings with more targeted 
policy implications.  
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